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Abstract
The use of collaborative networks services in general, and web based
social networks (WBSN) services in particular, is today increasing and,
therefore, the protection of the resources shared by network participants
is becoming a crucial need. In a collaborative network, one of the main
parameters on which access control relies is represented by trust and repu-
tation, since access to a resource may or may not be granted on the basis of
the trust/reputation of the requesting node. Therefore, the calculation of
the trust of the nodes becomes a very important issue, mainly in business
to business (BtoB) social networks, where trustworthy nodes can increase
their benefits taking profit of their good reputation in the network. In
order to address this point, in this paper we propose a mechanism to dy-
namically compute nodes trust, based on their past behavior. The key
characteristic of our proposal is that trust is computed in a private way.
This is obtained by anonymizing the local log files storing information
about nodes actions.
1 Introduction
In several applications, such as peer-to-peer systems (13), social networks (4),
or recommender systems (1) trust and reputation cover a key role. Although
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the notion of trust is often associated with the one of reputation, there exists a
relevant difference between the two concepts. As pointed out by (8), trust de-
notes whether (and possibly how much) a given entity A considers trustworthy
another entity B. Therefore, trust expresses a personal opinion of A about B,
and thus trust can be considered as a subjective (or local) measure of trustwor-
thiness. By contrast, reputation denotes the trustworthiness of a given entity for
all the entities in a network. Thus, reputation expresses the collective opinion of
a community on one of its members, and thus it is an objective (or global) mea-
sure of trustworthiness. Additionally, an analysis of the related literature shows
that there does not exist a unique definition of trust/reputation (12), whose
definition may vary depending on the context and for which purposes they are
used. For instance, in current Web-based social networks (WBSNs) (9), trust is
a measure of how much a user trusts the other users in the network either with
respect to a specific topic (topical trust) or in general (absolute trust), whereas
in peer-to-peer systems the trustworthiness of a given peer mainly depends on
its reliability in providing a given service. In contrast, when trust/reputation is
used for access control/privacy protection (4; 5), trust/reputation should convey
information about how much trustworthy a given user is not to reveal private
or sensitive information to unauthorized users, and thus its purpose has some
similarities with the notion of security level used in mandatory access control
models (10).
Regardless of the specific notion of trust/reputation adopted, it is funda-
mental to devise mechanisms that help to automatically (or partially automat-
ically) compute the trust/reputation. Although several proposal exists in this
respect for peer-to-peer or social networks, we are not aware of similar proposals
when trust/reputation is used for access control and privacy purposes. There-
fore, in this paper, we propose a framework to address this issue. Our target
scenario is a BtoB web-based social network where releasing of resources and
personal/companies information is regulated by proper policies. However, the
mechanisms we developed can be used in other kinds of collaborative networks,
that is, networks where participants collaboratively carry out some tasks accord-
ing to the network purpose (e.g., releasing of resources in case of peer to peer
networks, or establishment of new relationship in case of general purpose social
networks). In our framework, reputation computation is based on the actions
performed by a network node with regards to the releasing of both resources
and private information (e.g., relationships a node has with other nodes). The
proposed mechanism exploits a local audit file to register actions performed by
each user.
Obviously, public audit files raise serious privacy concerns (11; 17) because a
participant might not agree in releasing (partial) information about the decisions
he/she has made. For instance, a participant might prefer not to make pub-
lic that he/she released some sensitive resources related to a patent of his/her
company. To overcome this problem we propose a framework where information
about decisions and actions performed by participants are available in an anony-
mous way. Here, the challenge is that of devising an anonymization strategy
of the audit file such that details about the performed decision/action are kept
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Figure 1: A portion of a social network. Labels associated with edges denote,
respectively, the type and trust level of the corresponding relationship.
private but, at the same time, it is possible to determine whether the decision
underlying the action is a correct or wrong one, with regards to the specified
policies.
Even though there is a lot of research in the field of privacy enhancement,
the work directly analyzing the privacy concerns of reputation seems to be
limited, particularly in the field of access control. Usually, when privacy issues
are addressed, trust computation services are centralized and the reputation
information is stored in a trusted central repository (18). Obviously, this can
be the bottleneck for the system. On the contrary, when trust computation
services are distributed (2; 3), and scalability is not an issue, user privacy is
disregarded. Up to our knowledge, our framework overcomes both problems,
user privacy is ensured because sensitive information is encrypted and a trusted
central repository is unnecessary because reputation information is distributed,
each node stores its information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain
some preliminary concepts about social networks, ElGamal encryption system
and aggregation functions. Then, in Section 3 we describe the overall architec-
ture of our framework, in Section 4 we explain our trust computation model.
In Section 5, our audit system is described. Finally, the paper draws some
conclusions and presents some future work.
2 Background
As pointed out in the introduction we consider, as reference scenario, a web-
based social network (WBSN) where access control and privacy requirements are
expressed through the specification of proper policies. Moreover, the proposed
solution makes use of the homomorphic properties of the ElGamal encryption
system and aggregation functions. For these reasons, in this section we provide
a brief overview of all these notions.
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2.1 Secure Web-based Social Networks
A common way to model a WBSN is as a directed labelled graph, where each
node corresponds to a WBSN member and edges denote relationships between
WBSN members. In particular, initial node of an edge denotes the WBSN mem-
ber who established the corresponding relationship, the terminal node denotes
the WBSN member who accepted to establish the relationship, whereas the
label represents the type of the established relationship. Moreover, since a rel-
evant feature of WBSNs is that relationships are characterized by a trust level,
representing how much a given WBSN member considers trustworthy another
member with whom he/she is establishing a relationship, we assume that each
edge has a further label, in addition to relationship type, modelling the trust
level. According to the considered WBSN model, throughout the paper we say
that two WBSN members A and B participate in a relationship of a given type
rt if there exists a path, consisting only of edges labelled with relationship type
rt, connecting A with B. The length of such path corresponds to the depth
of the corresponding relationship: if depth = 1, we say that the relationship
is direct, whereas, if depth > 1, we say that the relationship is indirect. Let
us consider, for instance, the WBSN depicted in Figure 1. D(avid) is a direct
partner of E(ric), but by means of the relationship he has with B(ob), he is is
also one of Eric’s indirect partners. Therefore, we define the depth of a relation-
ship of type rt between two nodes A and B as the length of the shortest path
between A and B consisting only of edges labelled with rt. Thus, the depth of
the ’partners of’ relationship between D(avid) and B(ob) is 1. Moreover, in case
of indirect relationships, the trust level corresponds to the multiplication of the
trust levels associated with each edge in the corresponding path.1 For instance,
with regards to Figure 1, D(avid) is a direct customer of E(ric) with trust 0.8.
By means of this relationship, D(avid) is also indirect customer of G(reg) with
trust value equal to 0.32. Therefore, in our scenario we are assuming that rela-
tions are transitive. In the general purpose WBSN, this has no sense with some
of the relationship types (i.e. father of), but in BtoB WBSN this assumption
is possible because relations concern to economic connections as ’customer of’
or ’partner of’, and this kind of relations are in some way transitive.
In this paper, we consider WBSNs where access control and privacy require-
ments are expressed and enforced according to the strategies proposed in (4; 5).
Regarding access control, we assume that each resource to be shared in the
WBSN is protected by a set of access rules, denoting the members authorized
to access the resource in terms of the type, depth, and trust level of existing rela-
tionships in the network. According to the access control model proposed in (4),
each access rule has the form (rsc,AC), where AC is a set of access conditions
that need to be all satisfied in order to get access to the resource having rsc as id
(i.e., URI). Formally, an access condition is a tuple ac = (v, rt, d max, t min),
where v is the member, referred as target node, with whom the requestor of a
1In the literature there exist several alternative models to compute the trust value of
indirect relationships. Since this is out of the scope of this paper, we have adopted the
simplest one.
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given resource must have a direct or indirect relationship to obtain the access,
whereas rt, d max, and t min are, respectively, the type, maximum depth, and
minimum trust level that the relationship must have.
Access control enforcement is performed based on a client-side approach ac-
cording to which a requestor is authorized to access a resource only if he/she
is able to demonstrate that he/she satisfies the access rules applying to the re-
quested resource. As described in (5), this implies that the requestor has to
provide to the owner a proof showing that there exist the relationships required
by the specified access rules, with the required depth and trust level. In order
to make a member able to generate a proof, we assume that each relationship
is certified, that is, each relationship is encoded by a certificate, generated by
the members participating in it and distributed by them to the other network’s
participants. According to this assumption, a proof of the existence of a rela-
tionship between two members is given by the set of certificates corresponding
to each relationship in the path connecting them. Thanks to this set of certifi-
cates, which we refer to as certificate path, the owner is able to verify whether
the relationship satisfies the constraints on depth and trust level stated in the
access rule. Moreover, the model proposed in (5) also allows the specification
of privacy requirements on the established relationships. Relationship privacy
requirements are stated through distribution rules. A distribution rule on a
relationship of type rt established by node A with node B, denoted in what fol-
lows as DRrtAB, is a triple of the form (v, rt, dmax), stating that the only nodes
authorized to be aware of the relationship of type rt established by A with B are
those that have a direct/indirect relationship of type rt with v and maximum
depth dmax. Certificates distribution is regulated by distribution rules. More
precisely, the key idea is that the nodes that have established the relationship,
say A and B, distribute the relationship certificate to all and only their direct
neighbours that satisfy the distribution rules they have specified for that rela-
tionship. The relationship certificate is sent to each neighbour together with
the corresponding distribution rule. Thus, each neighbour can access the dis-
tribution rule and decides whether he/she has to forward the certificate, and
distribution rule, to his/her direct neighbours. More details can be found in (5).
2.2 ElGamal
The ElGamal (7) encryption system is a public key encryption algorithm which
is based on the Diffie-Hellman (6) key agreement. This system is widely used in
many applications (e.g., the free GNU Privacy Guard software, recent versions
of PGP, and other cryptosystems).
ElGamal encryption can be defined over any cyclic group G. Its security
depends upon the difficulty of a certain problem in G related to computing
discrete logarithms. It is based on the following components:
Configuration. A cyclic subgroup G = 〈g〉 of Zp is chosen generated by g,
with order q, where q|p− 1 (q has to divide p− 1) for two prime numbers
p and q. p, q and g are public.
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Key generation. Choose sk ∈ Z∗p at random, and publish pk = g
skmod p.
Encyption. Encrypt message m ∈ G. Take r ∈ Z∗q at random, compute R =
grmod p and s = m · pkrmod p. The ciphertext is c = (R, s). r is kept
secret.
Decrypt. Given the secret key sk and the ciphertext c = (R, s), the plain text
is given by
m =
s
Rsk
mod p
ElGamal encryption system is multiplicatively homomorphic. That is, given
c1 = (g
r1 ,m1 · pk
r1) and c2 = (g
r2 ,m2 · pk
r2) two encryptions of m1 and m2,
we can obtain an encryption of m1/m2 as
c1 ⊘ c2 = (
gr1
gr2
,
m1 · pk
r1
m2 · pkr2
) = (gr1−r2 ,
m1
m2
· pkr1−r2).
Thanks to this property, a user who has encrypted the same message twice,
with ElGamal, can prove in a zero-knowledge way (14) that both plaintexts are
equal. To do this, after having published the two encryptions c1 and c2, he
has to publish the difference r1 − r2. Then, everybody can verify that the two
plaintexts are equal (that is, m1/m2 = 1), by checking if
c1 ⊘ c2 = (g
r1−r2 , pkr1−r2).
2.3 Aggregation functions
Aggregation functions (15) are numerical functions used for information fusion.
They typically combine N numerical values supplied by N sources into a single
datum. In this work, we will consider the OrderedWeighted Aggregation (OWA)
operator. Two definitions exist, one applicable when the number of sources is
known in advance, and another that do not require to know how many sources
will be combined. We will use this latter definition, that uses fuzzy quantifiers.
Definition 1 A function Q : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a regular monotonically non-
decreasing fuzzy quantifier (non-decreasing fuzzy quantifiers for short) if it sat-
isfies: (i) Q(0) = 0; (ii) Q(1) = 1; (iii) x > y implies Q(x) ≥ Q(y).
Two examples of families of fuzzy quantifiers are given below.
Qα1 (x) = x
α for α = 1/5, 2/5, · · · , . . . , 10/5
Qα2 (x) = 1/(1 + e
(α−x)∗10) for α = {0, 0.1, . . .0.9}
Using fuzzy quantifiers, the OWA operator (16) is defined as follows.
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Definition 2 Let Q be a non-decreasing fuzzy quantifier, then OWAQ : R
N →
R is an Ordered Weighting Averaging (OWA) operator if
OWAQ(a1, ..., aN ) =
N∑
i=1
(Q(i/N)−Q((i− 1)/N))aσ(i)
where σ is a permutation such that aσ(i) ≥ aσ(i+1).
The interest of the OWA operators is that they permit the user to aggregate
the values giving importance to large (or small) values. In the case of the
quantifiers given above, the smallest the α, the largest is the importance for the
largest values being aggregated. In contrast, the largest the α, the lowest the
importance of the largest values (and the largest the importance given to low
values).
3 Overall framework
The key idea underlying our model for trust computation is the consideration
that in the real world the trust value granted to a person/company is estimated
on the basis of his/her reputation, which can be assessed taking in account the
past behavior. Indeed, it is a matter of fact that people assign to a person with
unfair behavior a bad reputation and, as a consequence, a low level of trust. The
idea is to apply a similar rational to collaborative networks. That is, to estimate
the trust level to be assigned to a participant on the basis of its reputation, given
by its behavior with regards to all the nodes in the network. More concretely,
a way to capture participant’s behavior is to monitor the decisions and the
actions performed by them once they have received requests of collaboration.
For instance, the decision of releasing sensitive information to unauthorized
participants obviously can be considered as a signal of bad behavior. A naive
solution to make users able to monitor the behaviour of other participants is to
record into a public audit file each decision made by network participants. This
entry should store also information about the performed action, plus additional
information making other participants able to infer whether a right or wrong
decision has been made.
Obviously, public audit files raise serious privacy concerns because a partic-
ipant might not agree in releasing information about the decisions he/she has
made, even if these are signals of good behavior. To overcome this problem we
propose a framework where information about decisions and actions performed
by participants are available in an anonymous version. Here, the challenge is
that of devising an anonymization strategy of the audit file such that details
about the performed decision/action are kept private but, at the same time, it
is possible to determine whether the decision underlying the action is a correct
or wrong one, with regards to the specified policies.
The proposed framework assumes that each participant generates and makes
available to all other network participants an anonymized audit file. In par-
ticular, to avoid malicious participants to omit or insert fake entries into the
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anonymized audit file, we assume that this task is performed by a trusted mod-
ule, provided directly by the network manager upon subscription, that each
participant have to install in his/her computer computer. This module, called
auditor, monitors all the decisions performed by the participant and for each of
them it generates an entry to be inserted into the local anonymized audit file.
The maintenance of this anonymous audit file can be done once a week (or a
month) as an off-line process. Then, the performance of this conversion process
does not affect to the general network performance.
4 Reputation-based trust evaluation model
In this section, we introduce the trust computation model used by our frame-
work. As introduced in Section 3, the underlying idea is that the trust TAB
associated by a user A to a user B is evaluated based on A’s reputation RA, au-
tomatically computed considering A’s behavior. We believe the adopted model
to compute trust is orthogonal to the scope of this paper, and as such we as-
sume that the trust value TAB associated by user A to user B is given by a
generic function T () which takes as a mandatory input the reputation value
RA.Therefore, in what follows we focus on reputation computation.
When a participant performs all decisions in accordance with the specified
distribution and access rules, he/she has a good behavior and therefore he/she
has to be assigned a good reputation (the reputation value has to be maximum
and, thus, equal to 1). In contrast, if a participant does not make a correct
decision, his/her reputation level should be lower.
To formalize the model, we need to first introduce the possible wrong deci-
sions a participant can make in the reference social network scenario. These are
identified by considering the two main requests of collaboration a participant
receives in a social network: (a) the request for releasing a resource, according
to the specified access control rules, and (b) the request for distributing a cer-
tificate, on the basis of the specified distribution rules. Then, we have a wrong
(bad) decision when a user decides to deny a owned or delegated resource to
an authorized user (e.g., a user does not release a resource rsc even if the re-
questor provides a correct proof which matches the specified access rules). We
call this wrong decision denial of resource releasing (DRR). A similar wrong
decision can be made with regard to certificate distribution, when a user de-
cides not to distribute a certificate to some of his/her neighbors, even if they
are authorized to receive it according to the specified distribution rules. We call
this wrong decision denial of certificate distribution (DCD). A further kind of
wrong decisions come when a user decides to disseminate resources/certificates
to non-authorized users. For instance, a user can release a resource rsc when the
provided proof is not correct. In this case, we refer to an unauthorized resource
dissemination (URD). A similar wrong decision can be done with certificates.
In this case, we have an unauthorized certificate dissemination (UCD).
In devising the model for reputation computation, we consider that not all
wrong decisions have the same relevance. For example, in the case of denial of
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certificate distribution (DCD), not to disseminate a certificate whose distribu-
tion rule has depth equal to 4 has not the same importance as not distribute a
certificate with depth equal to 1. Indeed, the consequence of the first decision
is more serious than the second one, since it affects more users of the social
network. Similar considerations hold for other wrong decisions. To model the
relevance of wrong decisions, we further classify them according to five dimen-
sions: three related to requests of releasing a resource, or as we denote here,
related to access control decisions, and two related to certificate distribution.
In relation to access control decisions, let us consider the decision of a user
A about releasing or not to user B a resource rsc. Let us assume that AR is the
access rule applying to rsc, and that crt path is the certificate path provided
by user B as a proof. Then, the first dimension, denoted by ACt and called trust
dimension, corresponds to the difference between the minimum trust required
in AR and the trust computed based on the path extracted from crt path.
Note that when ACt is lower than zero and the resource has not been released,
A commits a DRR. In contrast, if ACt is greater than zero and the resource
has been released, A commits a URD. The second dimension, referred to as
depth dimension, denoted as ACd, is defined as the difference between the depth
required in AC and the depth of the path extracted from crt path. The third
dimension, called path dimension denoted as ACp, is used to model situations
as the next one. Let us consider an access rule consisting only of the following
access condition AC = (B, cof, 3, 0.5), and let p = (A →cof B)(B →pof E) be
the path extracted from crt path. Obviously, this crt path is not a valid proof,
since the pof relationship is not referred by the access rule, and the last node in
the path is not the target node specified in the access condition. Formally, ACp
is an integer value ranging from 0 to 3: 0 if the path extracted from crt path is
correct or adding one for each of the following problems in the path: (a) there
exists in the path at least a relationship whose type is not equal to the one
required in AC; (b) the first node (resp. last node) in the path is not equal to
the requestor (resp. the target node) in AC; (c) there exists in the path at least
a relationship r such that the node whose established it is not equal to the node
with which the relationship preceding r has been established.
Similar dimensions are also defined for decisions made as a consequence
of a request for certificate distribution. More precisely, let us consider the
decision of a user A to disseminate to user B the certificate cert, to which
the distribution rule DRrel is applied. Moreover, let crt path be the set of
certificates corresponding to the path that cert has traversed to reach A. Then,
we define a depth dimension related to the certificate distribution decision,
denoted with CDd, as the difference between the maximum depth required in
DRrel and the depth of the path extracted from crt path. Finally, we define the
path dimension, denoted as CDp, as for ACp.
In order to combine these dimensions, values have to be in a common do-
main. In practice, we map all such values in the [0, 1] interval. Formally, the
path dimension is normalized dividing the values by 3 (the maximum difference
allowed in the previous definition) and the depth dimension is normalized divid-
ing the corresponding values by a constant (the maximum difference expected;
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in case of larger values than expected, the dimension is set to one). Note that
the trust dimension is already in the [0, 1] domain.
Example 1 Let us consider the social network in Figure 1, and suppose that
D(avid) administers the resource rsc1 with access rule ARrsc1 = (rsc1, {(G, pof,
2, 0.25)}). Suppose that B(ob) wishes to access rsc1 and that he provides a
certificate path crt path containing the path p = (B→(pof,0.4) E)(E→(cof,0.4) G).
Once the proof is received by David, he decides to send the resource rsc1 to
Bob. Afterwards, David’s auditor computes the different dimensions for access
control decisions. First, it computes ACt = 0.09 (p’s trust is lower than the
minimum trust required in ARrsc1), then it computes ACd = 0 (p’s depth is equal
to the maximum depth required in ARrsc1) and, finally, ACp = 1 ( i.e., the provided
proof presents a problem: the relationship type cof is not allowed). These results
imply that Bob is not allowed to access rsc1 because Bob’s request does not fulfill
two of the three access control dimensions. If David sends the resource rsc1 to
Bob, this is an example of unauthorized resource dissemination (URD).
Let us now formalize how we combine all the wrong decisions taken by user A
to calculate his/her overall reputation value RA. To do so, we first aggregate the
values in each dimension and then combine all the dimensions. The aggregation
in each dimension is based on the OWA operator (defined in Section 2.3) that
permits to represent either the case of assigning larger importance to the most
serious decisions (the ones with larger values), or to assign the same importance
to all wrong decisions.
Definition 3 Let A be a user, let ACSETA be the set of access control decisions
made by A. Let DRRt ⊆ ACSETA be the set of DRR wrong decisions with respect
to trust (whose ACt trust dimension is lower than 0). Let URDt ⊆ ACSETA be the
set of URD wrong decisions with respect to trust (whose ACt trust dimension is
greater than 0). Then, the set of wrong decisions related to access control with
respect to trust is defined as WDtA:= DRRt ∪ URDt, and the aggregated value
AGtACSETA of wrong decisions in WDtA with respect to the trust dimension is given
by the following formula:
AGtACSETA = OWAQ(wd1, . . . , wd|WDtA |)
where Q is a non-decreasing fuzzy quantifier, and wdi are the absolute values
of the ACt in WDtA (note that as OWA is a symmetric function, the ordering of
the wdi is irrelevant).
This definition aggregates the values for the trust dimension. The same
applies to the other dimensions. In this way, we obtain aggregated values for the
five dimensions presented above. We denote them by: AGtACSETA , AGdACSETA ,
AGpACSETA , AGdCDSETA , AGpCDSETA .
Example 2 Let us consider the social network in Figure 1, and suppose that
D(avid) only administers the resource rsc1, with the same access rule given in
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Example 1. Let us assume that David has participated in three different requests
for his resource rsc1. One of them is Bob’s request described in Example 1.
Another request is from F(red), that provides p = (F →(cof,0.4) G). David’s
auditor computes all access control dimensions and as Fred does not fulfills all
the conditions needed by the access rule ARrsc1 = (rsc1, {(G, pof, 2, 0.25)}) ( i.e.,
the path is not a valid proof), David decides not to send rsc1 to Fred. In the
third request from A(lice), she provides p = (A →(pof,0.2) C). At first sight,
Alice’s proof is not correct, because the proof only proves that Alice is a partner
of C(arl). When David’s auditor computes the dimensions for this access control
decision, he founds that ACt = 0.05, ACd = 1 and ACp = 1.
So, based on these values, Alice has not access to the resource rsc1. Never-
theless, David decides to send the resource rsc1 to Alice. Accordingly, David’s
decision is a URD.
Now, let us consider that B(ob) wants to create a new relationship with
David. To compute David’s trust, Bob has to compute David’s reputation, i.e.,
he has to compute all the dimensions of the access control and certificate dis-
tribution actions. For instance, to compute AGtACSETD , Bob has to decide which
quantifier Q wants to use. Bob decides to use Q11 because this quantifier assigns
a similar importance to all wrong decisions made by David. In this way, wrong
decisions with respect to ACt (with values ACt = {0.09, 0.05}) are aggregated.
Thus, AGtACSETD is equal to 0.07 (Definition 3).
We can now formalize the formula for the automatic computation of the
reputation value.
Definition 4 Let A be a user, let AGtACSETA ,
AGdACSETA and AGpACSETA be the aggregated values for trust dimension, depth
dimension and path dimension for access control decisions, respectively, and let
AGdCDSETA and AGpCDSETA be the aggregated values for depth dimension and
path dimension for certificate distribution decisions, respectively. The reputation
value RA of user A is defined as:
RA = 1−
1
5
(AGtACSETA + AGdACSETA + AGpACSETA
+AGdCDSETA + AGpCDSETA )
5 Audit files
As introduced in Section 3, the auditor of a given user A monitors each decision
made by A and stores it into a private audit file. A different entry is generated
to each distinct decision. According to our approach, the auditor also creates an
anonymized audit file available to all users of the WBSN, by considering each
entry in the private audit file. In the next section, we formally introduce the
information stored in the private and anonymized files, whereas we postpone
to Section 5.2 a discussion on how, by using this information a user is able to
determine whether a decision has been correctly evaluated.
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5.1 Audit file generator
Let us start to consider the private audit file. Since participants in the social
network can make two different types of decisions according to the received re-
quest (i.e., request for resource releasing and request for certificate distribution),
the audit file contains two different types of entries. The first type contains in-
formation about the decision made by a node A when he/she receives an access
request. We call this entry access request entry. To model this type of decision,
the entry contains information about the access request, the access rule asso-
ciated with the requested resource,2 as well as the certificate path provided as
proof by the requestor. The formal definition of the access request entry is the
following.
Definition 5 Let AcR=(rsc, r, AR) be an access request, where rsc is the iden-
tifier of the requested resource, r is the identifier of the requestor, and AR is the
access rule applied to resource rsc. The corresponding access request entry is
defined as:
eac = 〈AcR, crt path, tp, dec〉
where crt path is the certificate path provided by the requestor r as a proof,
tp is the trust value computed from the path extracted from crt path, and dec
is a boolean value set to 1 if the resource rsc has been released to requestor r,
set to 0, otherwise.
Example 3 Consider the social network in Figure 1, and suppose again that
D(avid) administers the resource with identifier rsc1 with the access rule ARrsc1 =
(rsc1, {(G, pof, 2, 0.25)}). B(ob) wishes to have access to rsc1 and he pro-
vides a crt path from which the following path is extracted: p = (B →(pof,0.4)
E)(E →(cof,0.4) G). David decides to send the resource rsc1 to Bob, therefore
David’s auditor generates the following access request entry:
eac = 〈(rsc1, B, (rsc1, {(G, pof, 2, 0.25)})),
(B→(pof,0.4) E)(E→(cof,0.4) G), 0.16, 1〉
The other kind of entries contained in the audit file are related to the deci-
sions made by a node A when he/she receives a request to distribute a certificate.
This type of entry, called certificate distribution entry, contains information
about the certificate to be distributed, the user who established the correspond-
ing relationship, the distribution rule associated with it, as well as information
about the path the certificate has traversed to reach A. The formal definition
of the certificate distribution entry is the following.
Definition 6 Let user A be the owner of the audit file. Let CdR=(cert, rl, DR,
s, crt path) be a request for certificate distribution, where cert is the certificate
2In what follows, for simplicity, we suppose that each resource is protected by a single
access rule.
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to be distributed, rl is the corresponding relationship, DRrl is the associated
distribution rule, s is the A’s neighbour sending the request for distribution,
and crt path is the certificate path corresponding to the path certificate cert
has traversed to reach A. The corresponding certificate distribution entry is
defined as:
ecd = 〈CdR, r, rt(A,r), dec〉
where r is the identifier of A’s neighbour, rt(A,r) is the type of the relationship
between A and r, and dec is a boolean value set to 1 if the certificate cert has
been released to neighbour r, set to 0, otherwise.
Example 4 Consider the social network in Figure 1, and suppose that D(avid)
and C(arl) create a relationship rl of type pof and trust equal to 0.6. Let cert
pof
D,C
be the certificate generated for relationship rl. Let DR
pof
D,C = (D, pof, 2) be the dis-
tribution rule for certpofD,C . E(ric) receives the certificate cert
pof
D,C from David.
Suppose that Eric sends such certificate to G(reg). Once the certificate certpofD,C
is released, Eric’s auditor generates the following certificate distribution entry:
ecd = 〈(cert
pof
D,C , rl, {(D, pof, 2)}, D,
{(D→(pof,0.5) E)}), G, cof, 1〉
According to the proposed strategy, the anonymized audit file is generated
by anonymizing each entry of the audit file, that is, the access request and
the certificate distribution entries. In the following, we introduce the formal
definition of the anonymized access request entry and the anonymized distribu-
tion certificate entry. In both the definitions, we exploit notation C(R, text) to
denote the ElGamal encryption of text by using the random number r.
Let us start to define the anonymized access request entry.
Definition 7 Let user A be the owner of an audit file f , and let eac be an access
request entry stored into f . The corresponding anonymized access request entry
is defined as
aeac = 〈Cr, Ctr, Ct, CRT, tp, tmin, dmax, dec, Cp〉
where Cr = C(Rr, r) is the encryption, using the random number rr, of the
requestor identifier stored into the AcR component of eac; Ctr = (Rtr, AcR.AR.tr)
is the encryption, using the random number rtr, of the target node of the access
rule AR contained into the AcR component of eac; Ct = (Rt, ear.tp) is the encryp-
tion, using the random number rt, of the trust value contained into the tp compo-
nent of eac; CRT is a set containing for each possible relationship type rtj in the
access rule AR of the eac.AcR component a distinct encryption Crtj = C(Rrtj , rtj)
using the random number rrtj ; tp is the trust value associated with the path
extracted from crt path; tmin is the minimum trust required by ear.AcR.AR, dmax
is the maximum depth required by ear.AcR.AR; dec is a boolean value set to 1
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if the resource rsc has been released to requestor r, set to 0, otherwise and Cp
is the anonymous path structure defined on path extracted from crt path (see
Definition 9 below).
In contrast, the definition of the anonymized certificate distribution entry is
given in what follows.
Definition 8 Let user A be the owner of the audit file f , and let ecd be a certifi-
cate distribution entry stored into f . The corresponding anonymized certificate
distribution entry is defined as:
aecd = 〈Cr, Ca, CRT, rt(Ar), dmax, dec, Cp〉
where Cr = C(Rr, r) is the encryption, using the random number rr, of the
identifier of the node who established the relationship; Ca = C(Ra, A) is the en-
cryption of the identifier of A using the random number ra; CRT is a set con-
taining for each possible relationship type rtj in the distribution rule CdR.DR a
distinct encryption Crtj = C(Rrtj , rtj) using the random number rrtj ; rt con-
tains the third component of ecd; dmax is the maximum depth of the distribution
rule contained in the CdR component of ecd; dec is a boolean value set to 1 if
the certificate cert has been released to neighbour r, set to 0, otherwise and Cp
is the anonymous path structure defined on path extracted from crt path (see
Definition 9 below).
Both the anonymized entries make use of the anonymous path structure. This
structure is the building block of the proposed approach to verify whether the
decision corresponding to an entry is correct or not. To verify the correctness
of a decision, it is essential to check the structure of the path extracted by
the certificate path crt path received as proof. In general, notwithstanding of
the type of the received request of collaboration, access control or certificate
distribution request, in order to determine whether the decision dec was made
correctly, we need to check the following characteristics of the path p extracted
from the received certificate path crt path: (a) whether all relationships in p
have type equal to the one required in the AR access rule, or in the DR distribution
rule; (b) whether the first node (resp. last node) of the first relationship (resp.
last relationship) in p is equal to the requestor (resp. the target node in AR) in
case of access request, or it is equal to the node who established the relationship
(resp. the node who has sent the certificate) in case of certificate distribution;
(c) whether all relationships r in p have the node whose established it equal
to the node with which the relationship preceding r has been established; in
particular, if r is the first relationship of p, the node must be equal to the
requestor in case of access request, or it must be equal to the node that has
generated the certificate in case of certificate distribution; (d) whether p’s depth
is less than or equal to the maximum depth required in AR or DR (e) only in case
of access request, whether p’s trust is greater than or equal to the minimum
trust required in AR.
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Thus, the anonymous path structure has been devised to make a user able to
verify the above mentioned conditions. In particular, the basis of such anony-
mous verifications are provided by the homomorphic property of the ElGamal
crypto-system. To exploit this property for comparing two texts, it is necessary
to know the difference between the random numbers used in the encryption of
both texts. Recall that each time that a message is encrypted with the ElGamal,
a new random number r ∈ Z∗q (kept private) is generated, and R = g
rmod p
(public). Then, the encryption of a messagem is computed as s = m ·pkrmod p.
The anonymous path structure is defined as follows:
Definition 9 Let A be a node in the network. Let crt path be a certificate
path contained into an access request entry of the audit file of A (resp. into the
CdR component of a certificate distribution entry). Let p be the path extracted
from crt path. Let d be the depth of the path extracted from crt path.
The anonymous path Cp generated from p is defined as follows:
Cp = 〈Ccp, Dt〉
where:
• Ccp is a set containing for each relationship rj in p, j = 1 . . . d a different
tuple of the form:
Ccp = 〈Coj , Cdj , Crtj , Ctj , Doj , Ddj , Drtj〉
where Coj = C(Roj , oidj) is the encryption of the identifier of the user with
which rj is established using the random number roj ; Cdj = C(Rdj , dj) is the
encryption of the identifier of the user who established rj using the random
number rdj ; Crtj = C(Rrtj , rtj) is the encryption of the type of relationship
rj using the random number rrtj; Ctj = C(Rtj , tj) is the encryption of the
trust value of rj using the random number rtj. Moreover, we set Doj as
the difference roj − roj−1 for j = 2, . . . , d; Ddj as the difference rdj+1 − rdj
for j = 1, . . . , d− 1; Drtj as the difference rrtj −CRT.rrti for j = 1, . . . , d
where CRT.rrti is the random number used in the encryption of the corre-
sponding relationship type in the CRT component of the anonymized access
request entry or anonymized certificate distribution entry. The differences
Do0 and Ddn are computed as Do0 = roj−rr and Ddn = rdj−rtr respectively.
• Dt is equal to Dt = rt − (
∑d
j=0 rtj), where rt is the randomness used to
encrypt the trust of crt path in the anonymized access request entry or
anonymized certificate distribution entry.
Example 5 Consider the social network in Figure 1, let eac be an access request
entry corresponding to the access request explained in Example 3. Then, the
corresponding anonymous access request entry is as follows:
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aeac = 〈C(Rr, B), C(Rtr, G), C(Rt, 0.16),
{(C(Rrt1 , pof))}, 0.16, 0.25, 2, Cp〉
where Cp is as follows:
Cp = 〈〈C(B, ro1), C(E, rd1), C(pof, rrt1), C(0.4, rt1),
(r01 − rr), (rd2 − rd1), (rrt1 − CRT.rrt1), C(E, ro2),
C(G, rd2), C(cof, rrt2), C(0.4, rt2), (r02 − r01),
(rtr − rd2), (rrt2 − CRT.rrt1)〉, (rt − (rt1 + rt2))〉
Appendix A presents an algorithm for generating, given a private entry,
the corresponding anonymized version. The anonymization process is based on
Definitions 7, 8 and 9. Thus, the first part of the algorithm is devoted to generate
the anonymized version of an access control entry. The requestor identifier (line
2), target node identifier (line 3), trust value of the path extracted from the
certificate path crt path (line 4) and the set of possible relationship types of
the access rule (lines 5-7) and are encrypted. Trust value of the path (line 8),
and Minimum trust (line 9) and maximum depth (line 10) of the access rule
are stored as a plain text, since this does not reveal sensitive information. The
second part of the algorithm is devoted to generate the anonymized version of a
certificate distribution entry. According to Definition 8, the requestor identifier
(line 13), owner identifier (line 14) and the set of possible relationship types of
the certificate distribution (lines 15-17) are encrypted. The relationship type
between the owner and the sender of the certificate (line 18) and maximum
depth allowed by the certification distribution rule (line 19) are stored as plain
text. The last part of the algorithm is devoted to generate the anonymous path
structure of crt path. Here, for each relationship j in the path p extracted from
crt path, the components of Ccp described in Definition 9 are encrypted (line
21-37). Note that the algorithm also calculates the differences needed to check
the correctness of the path and encrypt the trust of the path p (lines 38-39).
5.2 Audit file verification
In this section, we show how the data contained in an anonymized entry can be
used by any WBSN participant to determine whether the corresponding action
is compliant with the specified access and distribution rules. We recall that, this
information is then exploited to automatically evaluate the user’s reputation (see
Section 4). In general, to verify whether an anonymized access control entry
aeac or an anonymized certificate distribution entry aecd refers to a right or
wrong decision, it is necessary to check the certificate path received together
with the request of collaboration to which the entry refers to.
Since to protect user privacy, in both the anonymized entries, informa-
tion about the certificate path are encrypted exploiting the ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme (see Definitions 7, 8 and 9), it is possible to verify the above-
mentioned conditions by exploiting the multiplicative homomorphic property
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of this scheme. In particular, in order to verify whether the above conditions
hold or not a user has to check that some of the encrypted values in the path
correspond to the same plaintext.
According to ElGamal scheme, this can be done in the following way: to
verify that an ElGamal ciphertext C1 = (R1, s1), obtained with randomness r1,
and a ciphertext C2 = (R2, s2), obtained with randomness r2, correspond to the
same plaintext, given the difference r1 − r2, one just has to check if
C1 ⊘ C2 = (
R1
R2
,
s1
s2
) = (gr1−r2 , pkr1−r2)
where g is the generator of the group G and pk is the public key of the audit
file owner.
Thus, provided with the differences between the random numbers exploited
during the ElGamal encryption, an user is able to verify the certificate path
correctness. According to Definition 9, all these differences are available in the
second component of the anonymous path structure.
Formally, action verification and path reviewing process are described in
Algorithms A and A in Appendix A. Given in input an anonymous entry,
these algorithms compute all the action dimensions needed to compute the final
participant reputation. These algorithms first checks if a given action is an
action with a wrong decision or not, this check is done by the Algorithm A.
Algorithm A checks all the possible combinations of dimensions producing a
denial of service or an unauthorized dissemination (for both access control and
certificate distribution actions). Here, it is necessary to know the participant
decision (i.e. the dec variable). Recall that, If a resource has to be released
or a certificate distributed dec will be equal 1, 0 otherwise. For instance, lines
2-4 check if an access control decision is a denial of resource releasing (DRR),
verifying if the path trust is lower than the minimum trust or the path depth is
larger than the maximum depth of the corresponding rule and the participant
decision is equal to 1. Note that, the path dimension is verified in lines 8-18
where all the components of each certificate of the certificate path cer path are
checked.
Once the wrong decisions has been retrieved, the user can exploit the cor-
responding anonymous entries to compute the aggregate values introduced in
Section 4, and then to compute the reputation value to being associated with
the owner of the audit file. This is done in Algorithm A. This algorithm nor-
malizes all components of wrong decisions (lines 5-9) and computes the final
reputation value using the OWA operator (line 10).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a complete framework to dynamically compute
the reputation of a collaborative network participant, when trust is used to
access control and privacy protection pourposes. The main characteristic of our
approach is that reputation computation is done in a private way. We have also
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described in details how to implement our framework in a Web-based Social
Network.
As future work, we plan to develop a java-based implementation of the pro-
posed framework in order to test its performance.
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Require: e = private entry and et = entry type.
1: if (et = ac) then
2: ae.Cr = C(Rr , e.AcR.r) with the random number rr
3: ae.Ctr = C(Rtr , e.AcR.AR.rtr) with the random number rtr
4: ae.Ct = C(Rt, e.tp) with the random number rtp
5: for (j = 0; j ≤ e.AcR.AR.rt.length; j ++) do
6: ae.CRT = ae.CRT ∪ C(Rrtj , e.AcR.AR.rtj) with the random number
rrtj
7: end for
8: ae.tp = e.tp
9: ae.tmin = e.AcR.ARrsc.tmin
10: ae.dmax = e.AcR.ARrsc.dmax
11: end if
12: if (et = cd) then
13: ae.Cr = C(Rr , e.CdR.rl.r) with the random number rr
14: ae.Cowner = C(Ra, owner) with the random number ra
15: for (j = 0; j ≤ e.CdR.DR.rt.length; j ++) do
16: ae.CRT = ae.CRT ∪C(Rrtj , e.CdR.DR.rtj) with the random number
rrtj
17: end for
18: ae.rt = e.CdR.DR.rt
19: ae.dmax = e.CdR.DR.dmax
20: end if
21: for (j = 0; j ≤ e.crt path.length; j ++) do
22: Coj = C(Roj , oj) with the random number roj
23: Cdj = C(Rdj , dj) with the random number rdj
24: Crtj = C(Rrtj , rtj) with the random number rrlj
25: if (j = 0) then
26: Do = rr − ro0
27: else
28: Do = roj − roj−1
29: end if
30: if (j = e.crt path.length) then
31: Dlj = rd − rdj
32: else
33: Dd = rdj − rdj−1
34: end if
35: Drtj = rrtj − e.CRT.rrtj
36: ae.Cp = ae.Cp ∪ 〈Coj , Cdj , Crtj , Do, Dd, Drt〉
37: end for
38: Dt = rt − (
∑e.crt path.length
j=0 rtj )
39: ae.Cp = ae.Cp ∪ 〈Dt〉
40: return ae = anonymous entry.
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Require: AEac = set of access request entries, AEcd =
set of certificate distribution entries.
1: WDtac,WDdac,WDpac = dimensions for access control decisions
2: WDdcd,WDpcd = dimensions for certificate distribution decisions
3: Access control action verification(AEac,WDtac,WDdac,WDpac)
4: Certificate distribution action verification(AEdc,WDdcd,WDpcd)
5: WDtac = Normalize(DRRt) ∪Normalize(URDt)
6: WDdac = Normalize(DRRd) ∪Normalize(URDd)
7: WDpac = Normalize(DRRp) ∪Normalize(URDp)
8: WDdcd = Normalize(DCDt) ∪Normalize(UCDt)
9: WDpcd = Normalize(DCDp) ∪Normalize(UCDp)
10: R = 1 − (OWAQ(WDtac) + OWAQ(WDdac) + OWAQ(WDpac) +
OWAQ(WDdcd) +OWAQ(WDpcd))/5
11: return R
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Require: ae = anonymous entry, et = anonymous entry type, DS = boolean,
US = boolean.
1: Ctt = 1
2: if (((ea.tp < ea.tmin) or (ea.dmax < ea.Cp.length) or (ae.Cr 6= ae.Cp.Col0)
or (ae.Ctr 6= ae.Cp.Coln)) and (et = ac) and (ea.dec = 1)) then
3: US = true
4: end if
5: if (((ea.dmax < ea.Cp.length) or (ae.Cr 6= ae.Cp.Col0) or (ae.Ctr 6=
ae.Cp.Coln)) and (et = cd) and (ea.dec = 1)) then
6: US = true
7: end if
8: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
9: if ((ae.Cp.Cdli 6= ae.Cp.Coli+1) or (ae.Cp.Crtli 6= ae.Cp.Crtj )) and (et =
ac) and (ea.dec = 1)) then
10: US = true
11: end if
12: if ((ae.Cp.Cdli 6= ae.Cp.Coli+1) or (ae.Cp.Crtli 6= ae.Cp.Crtj )) and (et =
cd) and (ea.dec = 1)) then
13: US = true
14: end if
15: if (et = ac) then
16: Ctt = Ctt × ae.Cp.Ctli
17: end if
18: end for
19: if ((ae.Cp.Ct 6= Ctt) and (et = ac) and (ea.dec = 1)) then
20: US = tue
21: end if
22: if (((ea.tp ≥ ea.tmin) and (ea.dmax ≥ ea.Cp.length) and (ae.Cr =
ae.Cp.Col0) and (ae.Ctr = ae.Cp.Coln)) and (et = ac) and (ea.dec = 0))
then
23: DS = true
24: end if
25: if (((ea.dmax ≥ ea.Cp.length) and (ae.Cr = ae.Cp.Col0) and (ae.Ctr =
ae.Cp.Coln)) and (et = cd) and (ea.dec = 0)) then
26: DS = true
27: end if
28: return US, DS
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Require: AEac = set of access request entries,
WDtac,WDdac,WDpac = dimensions for access control decisions.
1: for ae ∈ AEac do
2: DS = false, US = false, p = 0
3: Action verification(ae,’ac’,DS,US)
4: if (US = true) then
5: if (ea.tp < ea.tmin) then
6: DRRt = DRRt ∪ 〈|ae.tmin − ae.tp|〉
7: end if
8: if (ea.dmax < ea.Cp.length) then
9: DRRd = DRRd ∪ 〈|ea.Cp.length− ea.dmax|〉
10: end if
11: if (ae.Cr 6= ae.Cp.Col0) or (ae.Ctr 6= ae.Cp.Coln)) then
12: p = p+ 1
13: end if
14: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
15: if (ae.Cp.Cdli 6= ae.Cp.Coli+1) then
16: p = p+ 1 break
17: end if
18: end for
19: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
20: if (ae.Cp.Crtli 6= ae.Cp.Crtj ) then
21: p = p+ 1 break
22: end if
23: end for
24: if (p 6= 0) then
25: DRRp = DRRp ∪ 〈p〉
26: end if
27: end if
28: if (DS = true) then
29: p = 0
30: if (ea.tp ≥ ea.tmin) then
31: URDt = URDt ∪ 〈|ae.tmin − ae.tp|〉
32: end if
33: if (ea.dmax ≥ ea.Cp.length) then
34: URDd = URDd ∪ 〈|ea.Cp.length− ea.dmax|〉
35: end if
36: if (ae.Cr = ae.Cp.Col0) or (ae.Ctr = ae.Cp.Coln)) then
37: p = p+ 1
38: end if
39: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
40: if (ae.Cp.Cdli = ae.Cp.Coli+1) then
41: p = p+ 1 break
42: end if
43: end for
44: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
45: if (ae.Cp.Crtli = ae.Cp.Crtj ) then
46: p = p+ 1 break
47: end if
48: end for
49: if (p 6= 0) then
50: URDp = URDp ∪ 〈p〉
51: end if
52: end if
53: end for
54: return WDtac, WDdac, WDpac
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Require: AEcd = set of certificate distribution entries,
WDdcd,WDpcd = dimensions for certificatedistribution decisions.
1: for ae ∈ AEcd do
2: DS = false, US = false, p = 0
3: Action verification(ae,”cd”,DS,US)
4: if (US = true) then
5: if (ea.dmax < ea.Cp.length) then
6: CDCd = CDCd ∪ 〈|ea.Cp.length− ea.dmax|〉
7: end if
8: if (ae.Cr 6= ae.Cp.Col0) or (ae.Ctr 6= ae.Cp.Coln)) then
9: p = p+ 1
10: end if
11: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
12: if (ae.Cp.Cdli 6= ae.Cp.Coli+1) then
13: p = p+ 1 break
14: end if
15: end for
16: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
17: if (ae.Cp.Crtli 6= ae.Cp.Crtj ) then
18: p = p+ 1 break
19: end if
20: end for
21: if (p 6= 0) then
22: DCDp = DCDp ∪ 〈p〉
23: end if
24: end if
25: if (DS = true) then
26: p = 0
27: if (ea.dmax ≥ ea.Cp.length) then
28: UCDd = UCDd ∪ 〈|ea.Cp.length− ea.dmax|〉
29: end if
30: if (ae.Cr = ae.Cp.Col0) or (ae.Ctr = ae.Cp.Coln)) then
31: p = p+ 1
32: end if
33: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
34: if (ae.Cp.Cdli = ae.Cp.Coli+1) then
35: p = p+ 1break
36: end if
37: end for
38: for (i = 0; i < ae.Cp.length; i++) do
39: if (ae.Cp.Crtli = ae.Cp.Crtj ) then
40: p = p+ 1 break
41: end if
42: end for
43: if (p 6= 0) then
44: UCDp = UCDp ∪ 〈p〉
45: end if
46: end if
47: end for
48: return WDdcd, WDpcd
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